IDENTITIES AND ASPIRATIONS

Centre for Strategic Futures, Singapore Foresight Conference 2017

ABOUT CSF

The Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF) was established in early 2009, and since 1 July 2015 has been part of the Strategy Group in the Prime Minister's Office. CSF serves as a focal point for futures thinking within the Singapore Government and seeks to support a Public Service that operates strategically in a complex and fast-changing environment.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 3 Understanding "Identity" 4 The Influence of Religion, Ethnicity and Language 6 Technology Accelerating and Amplifying Change Technology Changing Future Work Identities 13 National Identity and the Role of the State 15 The Way Forward 18 Annex 20



The Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF), Singapore, held its fourth Foresight Conference from 20-21 July 2017 at the Raffles City Convention Centre. The Conference is an important part of the Singapore Government's strategic foresight effort, which is aimed at helping policy-makers navigate the increasingly complex and inter-connected global operating environment. Foresight Conference serves as a unique platform for the discussion of emerging strategic issues between international and local thought leaders.

The Conference was part of Singapore Foresight Week, held alongside the Complexity Workshop organised by <u>The</u> <u>Complexity Institute</u>, under the Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Both events were preceded in the week by the <u>7th International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) Symposium</u> organised by the RAHS Programme Office (RPO) at the National Security Coordination Secretariat, Prime Minister's Office, in Singapore.

The theme for Foresight Conference 2017 was Identities and Aspirations. In an era of global connectivity and urbanisation, individuals and communities with different backgrounds and perspectives are compelled to interact with each other, whether over economic transactions, social issues or political interests, for better or for worse. The way these diverse groups of people view themselves and their future will both influence and be influenced by such interactions in crucial ways. Future trends in religion, work, technology, ethnicity and nationality will also change how identities are shaped, giving rise to profound implications on societies across the globe. The Conference discussed how these trends will continue to shape identities in the future, and how these dynamics will impact the world.

This is a summary of the discussions at the Conference, which was held in accordance with the Chatham House rule. As such, the record is only of the views articulated, and does not indicate the speakers or the organisation they represent.



UNDERSTANDING "IDENTITY"

At the conference, participants grappled with defining "identity" and exploring its general characteristics. The understanding of identity was crucial in laying the foundation for subsequent discussions around various specific dimensions of identity. It was also important in thinking about the state's role and influence on identity.

Participants found it conceptually useful to distinguish between three sorts of identity:

- a. State-ascribed identity the official administrative categories applied to individuals by the state;
- b. *Society-ascribed identity* labels which society applies to groups or individuals, which might be accepted or rejected by the groups or individuals; and
- c. Subjective identity the identity an individual ascribes to oneself.

State-ascribed identities, society-ascribed identities, and subjective identities can align or come into conflict with one another. For instance, society-ascribed identities may take reference from and reinforce state-ascribed identities, such as categorisations of ethnicity, occupation or citizenship status. But in other cases, state-ascribed identities may not resonate with society-ascribed identities, such as when the state does not distinguish between ethnicities or naturalised citizens and citizens by birth, but society does. If contestation between identities is unavoidable, it is crucial for both the state and its people to develop the emotional and cognitive capacity to engage in discourse on identity-related issues in a mature and respectful manner.

Shared identity does not automatically lead to solidarity, nor does it preclude conflict. This is because a shared identity does not eradicate differences and diversity among those who share the identity. Rather, as a participant put it, "nations are held together by ongoing commitments of a people, and their solidarity has to be built, not assumed". For example, there have been acrimonious disagreements between the American left and right, even though, or precisely because, they share identities as Americans.



Another example is the conflict between Sunnis and Shias, who both identify as Muslim. While strengthening an identity may assist in the process of building solidarity, identity and solidarity should not be conflated.

Shared identity might not require shared values. Participants discussed the extent to which shared values were necessary for community-building. Beyond a thin layer of shared values which were non-negotiable, participants concluded that a shared identity could easily accommodate mutually-incompatible values. People could share



identities while being very clear that they were different from one another, as in the example of two individuals who strongly identify as American, but have very different understanding of what it meant to be an American. As a participant suggested, one could love Singapore deeply while acknowledging that there were many ways to be Singaporean.





Religious beliefs, as well as their accompanying moral codes and practices, remained foundational to many people's identities. The enduring potency and allure of religion into the 21st Century had caught some participants off-guard. One participant noted that the West had wrongly assumed that the trend of secularisation in the latter half of the 20th Century, with the rise of science and technology, would continue into the 21st. Participants noted that even "nones" - those unaffiliated to any religion - had religious beliefs or even practices, both in the West and in other parts of the world. For example, in a survey in Singapore, nearly half of those who identified as non-religious said they nevertheless had some kind of religious belief, such as in the notions of karma, the afterlife or heaven.

Religion is difficult to separate from politics and the public sphere. Participants noted that the strict separation of religion from politics had not been the norm in history, and it was difficult to find instances in history where religion did not play a pivotal role in politics. Even in secular America, with the separation of church and state explicitly enshrined in law, its political history could be explained in terms of the Great Awakenings, which were waves of religious revivals among the population. A participant further noted that in states where the boundary between religion and politics was clear, the separation required active and consistent effort by the state, given that such a separation was by no means a natural state of affairs. This difficulty was compounded when failures in governance resulted in religious institutions stepping into the breach, playing the role of "mother, father, grandfather," because secular institutions had failed to do so.



Religious beliefs and organisation were not static, and were continually evolving within wider changing contexts. Factors driving change included the democratisation of society, the flow of ideas between religions, interactions with language and culture, and technological shifts. The following paragraphs describe these influences.

"Packaged" religions (see sidebar) may decline in the future and "non-packaged" give way to religions due to the democratisation of society. There had been a negative reaction against packaged religions due to scandals, oppression and abuses by its leaders. Radicalisation had also made packaged religion a toxic brand. Furthermore, people increasingly wanted more voice and choice today, in line with principles such as democracy and the free market. People were also beginning to have multiple identities which did not fit neatly within existing constructs. One participant couched this trend away from conservative packaged religion as being more about how conservative groups could no longer provide clear frameworks for the modern world. Another participant hypothesised that some religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism and unaffiliated Asian religions, were intrinsically non-packaged, and might experience a resurgence.

One participant described *packaged religions* as those which are exclusivist, rigid and neatly-explained. These versions of religion were birthed in a market era and had clear fundamentals that were easily sold. The simplicity and clarity of packaged religions provided refuge from the messiness and complexity of modern life. These approaches were also reinforced by states, which found it easy to find leaders of these religions to work and negotiate boundaries with.

Continued flows of ideas between religions will give rise to borrowed practices and beliefs. Participants noted that religions interacted with and borrowed practices and forms of beliefs from other religions. For instance, one participant noted that trends in Christianity had also influenced how Islam was understood. Historically and traditionally, Islam as a religion had encompassed more than the Quran. However, due to the "Protestantisation of Islam", Islam had become synonymous with the Quran. It was, the participant observed, now impossible to speak to a Muslim and tell him or her that the Quran was not the only holy text in Islam. Another participant described how Chinese religions, which historically had no clergy or central doctrine, had begun to respond to growing competition with other religions by developing institutions and language for imported concepts.

Culture and language had a profound impact on how individuals subscribed to religions. Participants discussed how the language in which a religion was practised affected how religions were viewed. For example, some individuals identified more with Western cultures and so preferred an English-speaking god or an English-language religion. Another example was how the translation of the Quran into English had shaped the common understanding of Islam. The translation resulted in a more rationalistic understanding of Islam by failing to convey the more mystical concepts. The participant who raised this mused that there was something about European languages that translated constructions of self and beliefs in different ways than languages like Arabic, Urdu and Persian.



People create their own gods; as people begin to embrace themselves with technology, what would the cyborg god be? Technology shaped religion by being a means of living out one's beliefs and values. One participant noted that major transformations in religion had coincided with major transformations in technology. For example, the rise of print technology transformed religions by offering new media for knowledge transfer – tellingly, the Diamond Sutra was the world's earliest complete

survival of a dated printed book. The Church was an early adopter of digital technology, with congregants attending services via live-streaming. The Islamic State had also used social media to radicalise vulnerable individuals online. Another participant observed that online communities allowed Catholic individuals who did not subscribe to doctrines concerning fertility treatments to support each other and discuss their different beliefs. This was an example of how online communities helped individuals to navigate challenging aspects of their religion.

Languages affect the individual and how they relate to communities and group identities. One participant observed that language shaped one's worldview and the way one connected to an identity. Understanding multiple languages increased the number of tools in one's conceptual toolkit, and allowed more nuanced discourse even within a single language. Languages also affected communities as communities were undergirded by certain rituals, some of which were intricately linked with language. When individuals lost the language, the rituals were often lost as well, and this resulted in a corresponding weakening of the community.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

"Conservative beliefs could result in unintended progressive effects on society."

One participant said that beliefs considered to be conservative, such as fundamentalist beliefs in Christianity, could counter-intuitively and inadvertently help societies to modernise in the course of adherents spreading those beliefs. These practices have even resulted in changes in society that went against the grain of the conservative teachings themselves. For example, the growth of Christianity across Africa, Asia and Latin America – regions known as the "Global South" – was driven by groups with very conservative theology. However, the practices of these groups resulted in a radical growth in literacy and reading in these regions. Another impact was a change in gender norms, since women's participation in church conferred roles that the larger society had not typically allowed them to assume, and resulted in a "Reformation of Machismo". Another example is how the centres of fanatical Protestantism – Switzerland, Scotland, New England and the Netherlands – eventually achieved Enlightenment and adopted a belief of "not needing God anymore".






TECHNOLOGY ACCELERATING AND AMPLIFYING CHANGE

Technology promoted the reshaping of identities more rapidly than ever before, and could transform an individual's sense of self. Technology has facilitated continual "self-making" through social media, promoting the constant curation of who we are, with pictures of ourselves and text messages. Another example is seen in those who became cyborgs (or "cybernetic organisms") through prosthetic enhancements. Cyborgs could feel more successful and privileged especially if their prostheses allow them to function at a higher level than others. For instance, celebrity cyborg Viktoria Modesta, born with a withered leg, an introvert by nature and bullied as a child, had a prosthetist design a synthetic leg that in turn had a transformative effect on her personality and self-confidence.

Multiple identities online and offline means that individuals are becoming "multiple" in ways they never used to be. This would result in the reconfiguration of traditional identities (such as nationalities, ethnicities and occupations) alongside the emergence of new ones. For example, participants observed a strong trend towards multiple or hyphenated, often contradictory, identities. A morally liberal, Bible-believing Christian was a "hyphenated identity" that might be seen as contradictory. Some would accept the tensions between these identities. However, people increasingly desired authenticity, and might find coherence by seeking a broader meta-narrative to negotiate these identities, such as a meta-narrative of the Bible.



Virtual spaces allow people to both escape and reinforce who they are offline. The media tended to portray virtual worlds as a form of escapism. This was true to some extent – one might be valued online much more than offline, such as in the case of a garbage collector who was also a chieftain in a *World of Warcraft* community. However, studies also showed that gamers tended to gravitate towards local norms and similar personality traits as in the physical world. In *Second Life*, a computer game that allowed players to create a virtual life of their



choosing, gamers continued to cling onto real-world status symbols they were familiar with, such as designer clothing and fancy hairstyles. In general, virtual reality users also commonly insisted on virtual provisions with real-world analogies but which were unnecessary in the virtual world, such as chairs for avatars to sit on when holding meetings or having virtual bodies with which to interact. Another example of the reinforcement of offline identities was how digital giants like Google and Facebook built echo chambers around their users, based on conceptions of users' identities and preferences.

Social media enables virtual communities to exist and thrive. With global connectivity and the ubiquity of the internet, new virtual communities were built mostly around common interests rather than a sense of physical place. One participant shared that he had built his own internet *kampong* (a Malay term which Singaporeans take to mean "home village"), comprising over 5,000 poetry fans in a Facebook group. These communities could mobilise at scale – for example, the participant had very successfully crowded-funded books and sourced volunteers for events through the group. However, this participant also noted that such an online network might not be able to help in the event of a local disaster, for example a bomb attack in the neighbourhood.

However, technology could also weaken communities by enabling efficiency that reduces the need for social interaction. Studies in videogames showed that improvements in efficiency and latency through technology had inadvertently modified social architecture. In old video games like *EverQuest*, the norm was to depend on other players for help as there were no maps or online databases. However, in contemporary online games where many functions were automated or in-built, players became self-sufficient, so there was less of a need for social interaction.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

"In the future, technology might be for the masses, while the elite distinguish themselves by being skilled at analogue human interaction."

One participant observed that people's fundamental needs for connection had not changed, so in the future, the real elite might opt out of technology while the masses lived through social media. Some of this was already happening today; many of the elite who worked in technology companies restricted their children from using iPhones. Notably, analogue artefacts such as board games that provided more face-to-face interaction were now gaining traction despite the advances in technology.







We might see increasing disaggregation of production, income, and meaning. As automation and Artificial Intelligence become increasingly competitive with humans at a variety of tasks, production, income, and meaning would have to be decoupled. One participant said that we were already seeing signs of it among the super-rich (whose income often comes from rent rather than production) and the especially vulnerable (who might receive income via social security policies). In the imaginable future where the economy was guided by a few people, it was difficult to see how income could still be tied to production, or meaning to income, even for the middle class.

The centrality of our professional selves to who we are was a modern development, and could unravel. One participant said that for much of human history, one's economic production was not an important part of one's identity. For example, the scientists and artists of the Renaissance did not place great meaning on their jobs. The current weight people placed on their work identities was not fundamental to human nature.

The symbolic economy might become more important. If jobs started to play a smaller role in people's identities – for example due to automation or the gig economy - people might seek greater meaning from other sources. The symbolic economy, where status, belonging, and connections were traded and earned, might take a more central place in people's lives. A present-day example was the well-to-do Emirati who did not place as much importance on work, but rather on "passion projects" such as falconry or opening art galleries.





NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE

Participants agreed that the state has a role to play in shaping identity. One participant observed that the state moulded a person's identity through governance and communication channels, whether deliberately or unintentionally. Given that this was the case, the state should at least be aware of its role in this process, and consider leveraging it. Another participant added that the state's role in shaping identity was a powerful tool for governing, and illustrated this through the example of Singapore. The central political project of Singapore's early days of independence was to define the Singaporean identity, which in turn formed the foundation for all other domains of governance, such as foreign or economic policy. This had helped Singapore to pull through the turbulent early years.



Communal identities are resilient and still salient to national identity. Participants almost unanimously emphasised the resilience and continuing salience of communal identities, especially that of religion and language. Such identities could be as much obstacles as they were constituent building blocks of national identity. Understanding how these identities were evolving was therefore crucial in enabling the state to effectively negotiate with them in the building of a national identity.

The state could identify state corpora or cultural ballasts that allowed the democratisation of the identity project. One participant urged states to search for the "trellises", referring to institutions or structures, which gave meaning to individuals' identities. Participants raised various examples, including that of the American Constitution as the corpus which united Americans. The Constitution belonged to the American people and they participated collectively in the interpretation of it. Shared values were another example. One participant observed that in Singapore, commonly-articulated values in focus group discussions with youth were multiracialism, meritocracy and incorruptibility. As a city state and young country, Singapore did not have a cultural bulwark against rapid change, and so would need trellises through which identities could emerge. States could also indirectly forge identities through inspiring optimism and building a common vision for the future. States could better understand what makes identity and aspirations meaningful by adopting an anthropological approach, specifically the qualitative method of ethnography. This was the most appropriate method for exploring complex and nuanced issues. However, the state should be wary of rigidifying identities in its attempt to govern or measure them. Participants agreed that identities were malleable and fluid, and this helped in building national identity. One participant said that individuals code-switching between identities and cultures should be seen as a "feature" or strength of the Singaporean identity, as opposed to a "bug". However, one participant cautioned that the state had a "Medusa Effect"¹ when it came to identity, since it "turned into stone" whatever it looked at. For example, in consultations with the public on minority group issues, states inadvertently cemented perceptions that those in the minority group were different. The Singapore education system's requirement for all students to be educated in their mother tongues similarly had the effect of reinforcing existing ethnic distinctions. Another example was how the state categorising people into certain occupational categories unwittingly highlighted divisions along occupational lines.

Participants also cautioned that the state should approach the identity project with a light touch. Individuals would resist certain forms of interventions regarding identities. In particular, "top-down, elite-driven" efforts reduced the buy-in of the masses. Some of the metaphors used to describe the ideal role of the state included how it played a role in shaping the environmental context in which identity emerged, akin to the "<u>sun and wind</u>" and a "<u>gardener</u>" that nurtured growth. Another analogy was that of a <u>facilitator</u> that re-established new terms of engagement and negotiation relating to identity and aspirations. In this model, the state should develop a vocabulary for discourse on the emotional and cognitive dimensions of identity formation and the trade-offs involved. This role also required the state to earn the trust of its people. Participants also said that the state should be flexible in responding and adapting to new identities that emerged in the future, and should remain open and neutral in its interactions to build solidarity between diverse groups with different norms. Finally, the state should also strive to include minority groups so as to prevent the emergence of hegemonic norms.

Participants highlighted some counterproductive practices by the state in shaping identity. The first was to frame discourse in terms of policy and facts, as this would reinforce the divide between a technocratic government and its people, and would cede influence to populist politics. The second was the state's tendency to control and dictate discourse when it sought public opinion. The third was to take credit for developments that strengthened national identity, such as sharing glory in a national sports hero's achievements for example, especially if the state had not played a large role in the process.

¹ Medusa was a character in Greek mythology that turned anything that looked upon her face into stone.





The two days of Foresight Conference 2017 brought together a smorgasbord of ideas, disciplines, perspectives and voices on the topic of *Identities and Aspirations*. Participants agreed that the issue of identity was a complex and amorphous subject, and questions discussed begot yet more questions.

What is certain is that we will continue to live with multiple identities, within individuals, communities and countries. The discussions clearly illustrate how even traditional forms of identity, such as religion and national identity, have been very fluid and constructed over the course of history, so in all likelihood, these identities will continue to experience profound changes going forward. These identities are constantly jostling for pre-eminence, sometimes conflicting and sometimes shaping each other.

We need trellises to shape and understand these identities. The growing trend of intuitively or traditionally contradictory identities within the same individual or community means that new trellises, whether metanarratives and meta-identities, may emerge to reconcile these in the future. The best ones would help individuals to find meaningful identities. We also need to adopt an ethnographic approach to better study and understand how potential or existing trellises could do this. The state could play its role by building these trellises and nurturing the identities of its people as a gardener, while avoiding the outcome of ossifying fluid identities.

New trends such as technology and the changing nature of work give us opportunities to reimagine our identities, but this requires us to be more cognizant of how they are reinforcing or amplifying existing ones. Perhaps technology and work could be seen as tools for shaping the trellises of identity. In a future where, hyperbolically speaking, technology is in and work is out, it is useful to think about how society and the state might learn the new ropes of "trellis management".

These ideas and more have challenged our thinking on *Identities and Aspirations*, and point us to potential futures. At the Centre for Strategic Futures, we have used them as seeds to nurture exploratory projects on cross-cutting issues, although where they will take us remains to be seen. It is also our hope that these ideas will set you thinking about the future in new ways.





ANNEX I: Programme

Day 1, 20 July 2017

Opening Remarks By Peter Ho, Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures

> Opening Keynote By Catherine Fieschi

Speaker Panels

One: Beliefs and Values How do our beliefs and values constitute, inform, shape, or constrain how we think of ourselves, and how others categorise us (and vice versa)? How might this change in the future? Two: Technology Three: Work and Class Four: Nationalities and Ethnicities

Day 2, 21 July 2017

"On Day One"

By Kwame Anthony Appiah Commentary on ideas raised on Day 1 of the Conference, put in context of wider discussions in the media, the literature and the world

Small Group Discussions

How might the changes in beliefs and values, in technologies, in the nature of work and class structures, and in ethnicities and nationalities, interact in the future? How might these interactions affect, or be affected by, identities and aspirations? What impacts might these have? What can we do to nurture or mitigate these impacts?

> Large Group Shareback and Discussion Jointly with Complexity Workshop participants

Closing Roundtable

Chaired by Peter Ho, Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures







ANNEX II: Participants

Kwame Anthony Appiah	Professor of Philosophy & Law, New York University
Chan Heng Chee	Chairman, Lee Kuan Yew Centre for Innovative Cities, Singapore University of
	Technology and Design
Terence Chia	Senior Director, National Security Coordination Centre, National Security
	Coordination Secretariat
Rosa Daniel	Deputy Secretary (Culture), Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth,
	Singapore
Catherine Fieschi	Executive Director, Counterpoint
Henry Finder	Editorial Director, The New Yorker
Han Fook Kwang	Senior Fellow, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
	Technological University
Peter Ho	Senior Advisor, Centre for Strategic Futures
Joshua Ip	Poet, Editor, Literary Organiser
Philip Jenkins	Distinguished Professor of History, Institute for Studies of Religion, Baylor
	University
Melissa Khoo	Director, Strategic Planning and Futures, Strategy Group, Prime Minister's
	Office, Singapore
Lim Shung Yar	Director, Community Relations and Engagement Division, Ministry of Culture,
	Community and Youth, Singapore
Richard MacKinnon	Executive Director, Borgfest
Aaron Maniam	Senior Director, Industry Division, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore
Mathew Mathews	Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore
Ebrahim Moosa	Professor of Islamic Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs, University of
	Notre Dame
Rohan Mukherjee	Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale-NUS College, Singapore
Divian Nair	Founder, Creative Director and CEO, Storyteller Productions
Richard O'Neill	President, The Highlands Group
Marina Oshana	Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Davis
Anju Mary Paul	Associate Professor, Social Sciences (Sociology and Public Policy), Yale-NUS
	College, Singapore
Thomas Philbeck	Global Leadership Fellow and Project Lead, Fourth Industrial Revolution,
	World Economic Forum
Noah Raford	Chief Operating Officer and Futurist-in-Chief, Dubai Future Foundation
Peter Schwartz	Senior Vice President, Strategic Planning, Salesforce
Tan Dan Feng	Co-Founder, The Select Centre

Tan Gee Keow	Deputy Secretary, Strategy Group, Prime Minister's Office, Singapore
Keith Tan	Deputy Secretary (Policy), Ministry of Defence, Singapore
Tan Li San	Deputy Secretary (Industry and Information), Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore
Tang Zhi Hui	Director, Policy and Planning Directorate, National Population and Talent Division, Strategy Group, Prime Minister's Office, Singapore
Terry Ver	
Tong Yee	Co-Founder, The Thought Collective
Linda Woodhead	Director, Institute of Social Futures, Lancaster University
Nick Yee	Co-Founder and Analytics Lead, Quantic Foundry
Ivan Yeo	Senior Director, Research & Data Division, Ministry of Communications and
	Information, Singapore
Yeong Gah Hou	Senior Director, Integration Directorate, National Population and Talent
	Division, Strategy Group, Prime Minister's Office, Singapore
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